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Book Reviews

Jacques R. Pauwels, The Myth of the Good War: America in the
Second World War Revised Edition, 2nd ed. Toronto: James Lorimer
& Company, 2015. Pp. 326.
American involvement in the Second World War has been questioned
by left leaning writers, academics, and other individuals since the
conflict began. Jacques R. Pauwels’ revised edition of The Myth of the
Good War: America in the Second World War continues this tradition
in a non-traditional manner. It challenges traditional perceptions
of the United States government’s goals during the conflict while
engaging with the established historiography. The objective of the
book is twofold. First, Pauwels states that the primary factor in
motivating the United States government during this period was
private corporate profit rather than idealism and altruism as is
normally presented when invoking the concept of the ‘good war’ (p.
7). This includes examining decisions that affected the entrance of
the United States into the war and its conduct before, during, and
after the fighting had taken place. While Pauwels struggles with
labels, this is a revisionist work. The second primary objective is to
challenge how historical works are created and the audiences they
are intended for. Traditional works, Pauwels argues, often only tell
part of the story. He argues these types of works are inaccessible to
the general reader (p. 11). Pauwels attempts to right this wrong by
presenting an encompassing work on the reasons that led the United
States to enter and become involved in the Second World War.
Pauwels’ sources appear to form the support for his primary
challenge to traditional historical scholarship. He rejects the use of
primary sources and only employs secondary sources. This creates
issues with his arguments, which I will return to later. In terms
of the actual prose there are no noteworthy problems. The writing
is accessible and clear throughout the work, which contributes
well to the goal to reach a more general audience. However, his
argumentation suffers from a lack of clarity at numerous points and
leaps in logic negatively detract from the overall argument. When
there is no evidence for one direction or another the author assumes
the case supports his conclusions. For example, when discussing
profits made during the war by enterprises with an American parent
in occupied Europe, Pauwels states, we cannot be sure who reaped
the profits. He seems to have assumed that these profits ended up
in the bank accounts of American bankers, which supports his thesis
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that American participation was motivated by financial gain (p. 235).
This is one example of many present throughout the text. There
are also a few historical mistakes made in the text that call into
question the author’s attention to detail. The Allied landings in North
Africa are said have to taken place in November 1941 in relation
to diplomatic relations with Vichy, which is over a year before the
United States actually entered the war (p. 54). Pauwels claims that
the Red Army stopped pillaging after passing through East Prussia
(p. 185). This is blatantly false as most works on the eastern front
note this behaviour continued well into the Red Army’s advance into
Germany.1 Mistakes such as these detract from the arguments made
throughout the book, and one wonders what other mistakes may be
present. Overall execution leaves much to be desired as the book is
filled with editing and historical errors that detract from the author’s
overall argument.
Methodology is as much of a part of the argument as is the
approach. Pauwels’ decision to use only secondary sources supports
his attempt to introduce a revisionist view to a wider audience. This
goal creates more problems than it solves. Relying only on secondary
sources can be done if one’s goal is to understand changing perspectives
on a topic. However, Pauwels’ use of secondary sources seems to be an
attempt to argue about historical events and reach conclusions about
the war and the events that shaped the Cold War. These arguments
are not fully developed as the result of this methodology. One positive
that does result from this approach is the wide geographic range of
sources made available, such as works from the western European
nations Italy, France, and Germany. Unfortunately, despite using
a broad research base, the sources utilised do not add depth to
the argument. The author claims that a wider geographic scope of
sources will benefit our understanding of the American involvement
in the war. While this effort is commendable, the sources used in the
book do not provide differing perspective; they only confirm previous
conclusions.

1
Gerhard Weinberg, A World At Arms: A Global History of World War II
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 786; Antony
Beevor, The Second World War (New York: Back Bay Book, 2012), 689; Max
Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944-1945 (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 2004), 477.

http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol26/iss1/8

2

St. Croix: The Myth of the Good War (Book Review)
26

Book Reviews

Pauwels’ writing is disjointed at times and he makes connections
between far ranging and unconnected events. This may be a reflection
of his goal to reach a wide audience but the examples provided
frequently require further explanation. Pauwels also writes off topic
from his primary topic of American involvement in the Second World
War. For instance, while analysing the war in Italy, Pauwels digresses
to discussions of the drug underworld connection to the war against
the Sandinistas and the sixteenth century political theory of cuius
region eius religio (pp. 119, 121). Anecdotes such as this appear
to be intended to help the reader, but they expand the evidence
beyond the context of the thesis. Detours in the writing detract from
the argument. Understanding Central America politics in the 1980s
or European religious rule does not support the argument that the
Second World War was not necessarily the ‘good war’.
The Myth of the Good War fits into the new left historiography
on the Second World War that arose during the 1960s particularly
in the United States. Pauwels relies heavily on scholars such as Gar
Alperovitz, William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Howard
Zinn to frame his argument. His work is difficult to situate in the
literature as, in my opinion, it does not add much to our existing
understanding; the book technically offers no new information due
to the sole use of secondary sources. This, however, does not prevent
Pauwels from asserting bold claims, such as the Second World War
was won with the Soviet victory in the battle of Moscow in 1941, or
that the Allies were ready to invade northern France in 1942 (pp.
9, 95). Pauwels continues the new left tradition of highlighting the
supposed lack of Allied support, through avoiding combat with Nazi
Germany, for the Soviet Union early in the war. This is coupled with
the argument that the American and British high command and
politicians wanted the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to slaughter
each other on the eastern front. Arguing that the invasion of Western
Europe was postponed due to sinister ulterior motives is but one
example of an argument being made with no proper documentation.
This work may seem to add to our understanding of the conflict,
but claims are made without any primary evidence and only tenuous
support from secondary works. Primary documents, had they been
used, would alleviate these concerns.
Pauwels’ work is not intended for an academic audience. His
introduction makes this quite clear and, therefore, the book is not
recommended for academic readers. Historical errors and leaps in logic
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demonstrate that this work should not be used in a formal education
setting. I do, however, recommend it for a general audience interested
in a compilation of revisionist ideas on America’s involvement in the
Second World War. I caution readers to think critically when moving
through the text and to be mindful of the historical misinterpretations
brad st . croix , university of ottawa
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